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different problem would have been presented but inasmuch as he has
continued in possession of the premises for four years, his action is dearly
deceit. Most of the cases are in agreement that falsity alone is insuffi-
cient; Douglas v. Plotkin, supra, a lower court case, is contra.
The decision sheds little light on the problem of whether a negli-
gently false statement will be sufficient for deceit. There are cases that
say that the statement muist be made with knowledge of the falsity; a
larger number in Ohio, that a negligently false statement is sufficient.
Between these views are assertions that the statements must have been
knowingly false or grossly negligent. The principal case says that to
establish liability defendant must be shown to have been guilty of "cul-
pable negligence." The expression is unfortunate. Is culpable negli-
gence more than ordinary negligence? Is it equivalent to gross negli-
gence? Are degrees of negligence to be recognized in deceit cases in
Ohio? The leading English case of Peek v. Derry, supra, holds flatly
that a false statement negligently made is not sufficient for an action of
deceit and a majority of the American cases purport to follow this view.
With numerous statements in the Ohio cases both for and against the
doctrine, a new authoritative statement by the Supreme Court that would
definitely align Ohio with or against the majority American view that
knowledge of the falsity is essential to an action in deceit, would be
helpful. ANNA FAYE BLACKBURN
DEFAMATION
LIBEL AND SLANDER - ORAL STATEMENTS HELD TO BE LIBEL
INSTEAD OF SLANDER
The plaintiff was an electrical contractor in the city of Elyria,
Ohio. Being a strong proponent of municipal ownership, he, both
voluntarily and by request, advised public officials in northern Ohio
against accepting the rate proposals of the defendant company. In Sep-
tember of 1932 the company received an anonymous letter attacking
the plaintiff's character and reputation. This was forwarded to the
defendant's general manager in Cleveland who selected certain state-
ments from the letter and deleted all portions favorable to the plaintiff.
A short time later the citizens of Amherst were considering the sale of
their local distributing system to the company, and, on October 13,
arranged a public discussion meeting at which the general manager
was to speak. The plaintiff spoke in opposition to the proposal. Follow-
ing his remarks the general manager arose and announced to the
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audience that he was about to read from the anonymous letter. The
statements read were defamatory and, in substance, described the
plaintiff as a professional agitator who could be "bought off" by any
corporation for a few thousand dollars. On the basis of this reading the
plaintiff brought an action of libel. The trial court awarded a judgment
of five thousand dollars against the defendant.
An appeal was taken on the ground, inter alia, that the action should
have been slander instead of libel. In support of this it was claimed that
reading aloud is no more than simple speaking, since both involve oral
publication. The court of appeals, however, affirmed the judgment
and, speaking through Judge Washburn, held that whenever a person
announces to a third party that he is going to read aloud from a writing,
and does so read, an action of libel will lie if the writing was defamatory
and was heard and understood by such third party. Ohio Public Service
v. Myers, 54 Ohio App. 40 (1934).
The most familiar distinction between libel and slander is that the
former is written while the latter is spoken. This definition early proved
inadequate, however, because it fails to account for defamation by
means of pictures, cartoons, effigies, etc. A better distinction is expressed
by Newell as follows: "Libel is defamation published by means of writ-
ing, pictures, images, or anything that is the object of sight. Slander is
defamation * * * published orally, by words spoken, being the object
of the sense of hearing * * * ." Newell, Slander and Libel, 4 th Ed.,
1924, p. i. To the same effect are Odgers, Libel and Slander, 6th Ed.,
1929, p. 2-8, and 36 C.J. 1146. But even this distinction will not
explain certain cases where actions of libel have been predicated on
statements which were oral in their inception or were published orally.
In certain situations there appears to be such a close relationship between
oral and written statements that the courts permit actions of libel. Such
situations are presented in reading aloud from a defamatory writing,
(as in the principal case) dictating to a stenographer, or transmitting by
sound a defamatory telegram. In other cases, particularly those involv-
ing the radio, phonograph, and talking pictures, the injury to the plain-
tiff is of such character that, as a matter of policy, courts have classified
the defamation as libel in order to invoke the rule of damages applicable
to that type of action.
The holding in the principal case is amply supported by authority.
As early as 16io Coke in De Libellis Famosis, 5 Coke Rep. 6o, and
John Lamb's Case, 9 Coke Rep. 6o, is quoted as saying that an action
of libel will lie when a party maliciously reads or sings a libel to another,
or having heard it read or sung, repeats it. Many of the later cases
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assume without comment that reading aloud from a defamatory writing
is libel rather than slander and discuss instead the question of whether
there was oral publication. McCoombs v. Tuttle, 5 Black Rep. (Ind.)
431 (184o); Adams v. Lawson, 17 Grat. (Va.) 261, 94 Am. Dec.
455 (1867), where defendant told witness of letter's contents after
mailing; Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. (N.Y.) 43 (1849); Jrohnson v.
Hudson and Morgan, 7 Adolp. & Ellis 233 (1836), where publication
was by singing in the streets; Miller v. Donavan, 16 Misc. Rep. 543,
19 N.Y.S. 820 (1896); Forrester v. Tyrell, 9 Times L.R. 257
(1893); Newell, 4 th Ed., p. 233; Odgers, 6th Ed., p. 131-44; 36
C.J. 1229. In Ieare v. Stowell, 12 A. & E. 719 (1840) it was said
that reading aloud from a writing would support either libel or slander.
Bosdell v. Dixie Stores Co., i67 S.E. 834, 168 S.C. 520 (1930),
seems contrary to Adams v. Lawson, supra, as to publication by quoting
from a letter already mailed. Also, there is no publication where the
plaintiff reads the defamatory letter to a 3rd party, Lyon v. Lash, 74
Kan. 745 (19o6), unless the defendant should anticipate such reading,
Lane v. Schilling, 279 Pac. 267 (1929).
The oral discussion of defamatory matter between two defendants
while composing a letter to the plaintiff may be sufficient publication of a
libel. Miller v. Butler, 6o Mass. 71 (1850) ; but has been held insuffi-
cient in Busby v. First Christian Church, 153 La. 371, 95 So. 869
(1923) and Senacour v. Societe La Prevoyance, 146 Mass. 616
(1888). The court in Weston v. Weston, 82 N.Y.S. 351 (1903),
reasoned that oral statements made to newspaper reporters with the
purpose of having them published was libel and not slander. Valentine
v. Gonzales, 179 N.Y.S. 711 (1920); Wheaton vr. Beecher, 79 Mich.
443 (189o)-
The specific point as to whether dictation of defamation to a stenog-
rapher is libel or slander has received discussion in only four cases.
Angelini v. Antico, 3' New Zealand Rep. 841 (1912) held that dicta-
tion was actionable as slander until transcribed, but as libel thereafter.
Cardozo seems of the same opinion in Ostrowe v. Lee, 245 N.Y.S. 393
(1931); while Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 52 L.R.A. 87
(19Ol) and Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (19o9),
would permit either libel or slander when the letter was dictated and
sent to the plaintiff. Other cases have been decided on questions of pub-
lication or privilege.
If the party dictating and the stenographer bear a master-servant
relationship sufficient publication is generally found. Ferdon v. Dickens,
supra; Nelson v. Whitten, 272 F. 135 (1921); Modisette v. Adams
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& Lorenze, 163 La. 505, 112 So. 397 (1927); Pullman v. Hill, i
Q.B. 524, 39 Week Rep. 263 (189I); Morgan v. O'Regan, 38 New
Brun. 189 (907); Pauterback v. Gold Medal Co., 7 Ont. L.R. 582
(1885). But in Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413 (1928)
transcription by the stenographer was viewed as a mechanical process
involving no publication to her. Gambrill v. Schooley, supra, is directly
contra on this point. Where dictator and stenographer are fellow serv-
ants-e.g., both employees of a corporation--several cases fail to find
sufficient publication. Owen v. Ogils~e Pub. Co., 53 N.Y.S. 1033
(1901); Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., 208 N.Y.S. 625 (1925);
Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So.
869 (1917); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414
(I916). But contrary to this view are Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Bailey,
io Va. 369 (1902); Berry v. City of N. Y. Ins. Co., 21o Ala. 369,
88 So. 134 (1923); and, by dictum, Kennedy v. Butler, 245 N.Y.
204 (1927). Recovery was defeated by privilege in Baxius v. Goblet
Freres, i Q.B. 843 (1894); and Edmonson v. Birch, et al., i K.B.
371 (1907).
Although sound is the medium by which telegrams are received and,
in the language of Newell, "the object of the sense of hearing," the
transmission was held to be libel, not slander, in Peterson v. Western
Union Tele. Co., 72 Minn. 41 (I888). The court reasoned that send-
ing a written message by sound was analogous to reading aloud from
a writing. West. Union Tele. Co. v. Cashman, 147 Fed. 367, 9
L.R.A. (N.S.) 140 (I9O6); 36 C.J. 1229; 17 R.C.L. 317.
There is always an effort on the part of plaintiffs to bring their
particular action within the catagory of libel. The reason for this is
that, in libel actions, special damages need not be proved. In all the
foregoing cases the courts have yielded to this effort because, as sug-
gested above, the oral and written forms of the defamation are so closely
allied. But in the cases which follow other considerations have impelled
the courts.
Historically, the injuries sustained through libel were said to be more
serious than those resulting from slander because, being written, it was
(i) more deliberate, (2) more widespread, and (3) more permanent.
But, as in many other fields, scientific advances have disrupted old
established rules of law. Oral statements made over a nationwide broad-
casting chain or in a widely disseminated talking picture are certainly
more injurious than many written defamations.
Realizing the great harm which may be inflicted by these new instru-
mentalities, defamation, through them, has been made actionable with-
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out proof of special damages. But in order to do this courts have been
forced to classify the wrong as libel instead of slander. Thus, in Soren-
sen v. Wood, et al., 123 Neb. 345, 82 A.L.R. lO98 (932), radio
station KFAB was held liable for defamation delivered orally over the
air without proof of special damages. For a general discussion of the
problem, and criticism of this case see J. E. Royce, "Defamation via
Radio," I Ohio St. L.J. i8o. Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466
(1933), another radio case, did not rule as to whether the injury was
libel or slander. But the legislature of Washington in 1935 enacted
that: "Every malicious publication by writing * * * radio broadcast-
ing, or which shall * * * transmit the human voice or reproduce the
same from records or other appliances or means * * * shall be libel."
Wash. Crim. Laws, Ch. 117, sec. 2424. This obviously includes
phonograph and dictaphone records, talking pictures, etc.
There seem to be only three cases involving defamation by motion
pictures. The action was obviously libel in Merle v. Sociological Re-
search Film Corp., 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915) where a silent film was in
dispute. But talking pictures gave rise to the same action in Brown v.
Paramount Public. Corp., 27o N.Y.S. 544 (I934), which involved an
imputation of immorality in the picture "An American Tragedy." An
English case, Yousoupoff v. M. G. M. Pictures, Ltd., reported in the
N. Y. Times on March 6, 1934; expressly held the action to be libel
instead of slander. A large verdict of £25,000 was awarded in this
case, which arose from certain imputations, made orally, in "Rasputin
and the Empress." LYLE E. TREADWAY
DIVORCE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS- RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES
OF DIVORCE WHERE DOMICILIARY REQUIREMENT IS SHORT
OR ABSENT
Of all divorce problems, that of the divorce obtained in a sister state
or foreign country is one of the most complex. This fact is due to the
great diversity of "residence" requirements. The following are the
"residence" requriements of the jurisdictions under discussion: Nevada,
six weeks;' Idaho, ninety days; 2 Arkansas, three months;' Florida,
three months; 4 Mexico, no residence whatsoever, and a divorce may be
'Nev. Sess. Laws, 1931, Chap. 97-
Idaho Gen. Code, 31-701, 1932.Ark. Sess. Laws, 1931, Chap. 71.
Laws of Fla., 1935, p. 444-
